
"Hindu legends tell of the Rakshasa (demon) called Raktabeej; he had a boon that every time an enemy spilled his blood on the ground, another demon would stand up to assist him. Such is the inevitable paradox of Islamic fundamentalism: unless we attack them they will take over the world and each time we strike a blow, they become stronger"
"Behead those who call Islam a violent religion."- The Fundamentalist Forces

The Pakistani military

The good news about the Pakistan army is that the United States owns them, body and soul. This means that, despite all the sabre-rattling and angry shaking of fists, there is no real prospect of them having a go at India, except in a worldwide doomsday scenario.
The bad news is that Pakistan has acquired nuclear weapons; which means that both India and the United States need to keep tabs on the progress of events in Pakistan.
There is very little that India can accomplish, diplomatically. Despite all the confidence building measures (CBM's), both sides in the civil war have an all-consuming hatred of India and therefore any Indian initiative, no matter how well intended is bound to be misconstrued to our detriment. Our only realistic chance is to exercise influence through Washington. Given that the interests of both India and the US in this part of the world differ only in minute details and not in broad outline, this is a very achievable goal. A peaceful Pakistan is so highly improbable that India must settle for the next best thing: A Pakistan so absorbed in internal conflict that it is not in a position to disrupt the workings of the civilized world, either in overt or in covert ways. Though unpalatable to us, we must stomach the fact that without American aid to the Pakistani army, the balance might tilt in favour of the Taliban. In its own weird way, Pakistan's nuclear capability works to our advantage, since their army sees the nukes as a permanent guarantee against Indian invasion, they can focus on their unending internal strife.
The Kashmir issue

The dream of retrieving Kashmir in its entirety and splendour might strike a cord. But we need to ponder: do we really stand to gain by pushing the Kashmir issue any further? How much are we willing to risk for a barren piece of land swarming with terrorists? Will it really help to recreate an Israel-Palestine style conflict zone a few hundred miles from our capital? Is it not simply better to move on and scale new heights of international prestige rather than spill blood on the Himalayas?
In summary, the Oracle maintains that, in the 21st Century, Pakistan should be viewed as a distracting detail and not the object of our foreign policy.