What is the big deal? The Indo-US nuclear agreement-I

There has perhaps never been an issue that has shaken up India's politics the way the Indo-US nuclear deal has. With global ambitions creeping into the Indian psyche, we Indians are investing in our future like never before. And if we are to achieve The Dream, we the people must watch over our elected government like never before.

Click here to read the text of the Indo-US nuclear deal

Click here to read the text of the Hyde Act

In terms of bare bones, the Nuclear Agreement will allow the US, as well as all other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to sell both nuclear fuel and nuclear technology to India. This gives a windfall of business to American companies and gives India access to cutting edge nuclear technology instead of having to persist in its attempts to reinvent each wheel separately. In return they ask that India use this nuclear fuel strictly for civilian purposes and that it be up to the IAEA to independently monitor whether India is sticking to this requirement. The big idea is that this would free up domestic uranium completely, thus allowing for a more rapid expansion of India's small nuclear arsenal.

First up, there could be nothing possibly wrong about the IAEA inspecting India's civilian nuclear facilities. Some of our facilities are old and not in good repair. International inspections would make sure that they are held to a high standard and eliminate concerns over a (dare we say it) major accident. This is the least compromise that one could be expected to make for living in a world community.

The question of national pride comes next. And this is where things get difficult. The Nuclear Deal is complicated by the US Hyde Act, which details American nuclear policy towards India. One of the particularly insulting provisions in the latter is the requirement that a comprehensive report on India's nuclear programme be tabled with the US Congress each year. The other disturbing fact is that the Hyde Act calls on both India and the US to "set a date for cutting off the production of fissile material ". Although the former is a cause for India to feel slighted, it is not in itself reason enough to reject an agreement with such profound implications. After all, the Americans could conversely point to the fact that they have swallowed their pride on roughly three decades of US policy, rolled back all the economic sanctions that followed Pokhran-II and lost diplomatic capital by admitting brazenly to the world that America will make exceptions for its friends. The latter is more serious. If the US were to put its foot down over the demand that India cut off production of fissile material at some point, things could get worse very quickly. Any number of things might happen in the future and it would be downright foolish to sign a document hoping that some clause in it would be forgotten in course of time.

Of course we all know that the powerful can make excuses for themselves. The concern is over whether this deal can be used to rein in India and actually prevent it from becoming too powerful, or more precisely, hold India permanently in place as a second class partner to the US. The fact that, in an emergency, America reserves the right to walk out of the agreement altogether and demand all the nuclear fuel back, does nothing to address these concerns. Despite displaying all the signs of a durable alliance, we should remember that India-US relationship is still in its infancy and one need not commit too much, too early. The text of the nuclear agreement says clearly that both sides understand fully that a recall of nuclear material would have extreme consequences on the relationship between the two nations. But are the odds against this course of action forbidding for America? The Bush administration has made America a very unpopular force in the world. As such, what could America gain by making enemies in New Delhi? But then again, this state of affairs might not last forever and America could gain in worldwide popularity again; surely this is something that could happen in the next 20 years which it will take for the nuclear deal to become fully operational.

Perhaps the weakest argument in favour of the deal comes from the question of energy security. This is all the more regrettable, since this is the one that is quoted most often. It is well known that the nuclear deal, when fully operational, would provide India with a mere 7% of its energy needs. If the time and energy spent on the diplomatic process and the money spent on buying foreign equipment were diverted to developing environment friendly, renewable sources of energy, or even to thorium based nuclear power, surely we could make up for this 7%. We have to digest the unpalatable fact that precious resources such as mineral oil and natural gas seem to occur almost exclusively in the most dangerous and disturbed parts of the world. As such, America and soon enough, both India and China, will have to fight more wars for oil.

It would be an extreme conclusion to say that the Nuclear Deal would make India into a subservient client state. To imagine that India, with its 1100 million fiercely proud people, with ever growing economic power to boot, could become subservient to any other nation is pure pessimism. The fact that this deal is on offer is a major diplomatic achievement that must be hailed by all; America has gone from imposing sanctions to ardently lobbying for nuclear partnership in ten years straight. America's apparent "generosity" has grown in direct proportion to India's rise as a world economic power. It therefore makes no sense to assume that the current deal is the best that we can get or that this deal can be availed only as long as Bush lasts in office. Although the UPA at home and some eggheads in the US (and businessmen wherever they are!) would have us believe that the deal is a "giveaway" and hence, a "limited time offer", there is no reason to buy into their self serving interpretation. However, it does make sense to see the Deal as some sort of beginning, a template that can be improved upon, the first step onto a minefield. It is dictated by geopolitical necessities, most of which will continue to exist long after Bush has left power.

If the Deal were to be dropped, perhaps the greatest losses would be incurred on the military front, with untold damage to India's credibility. Then there are issues that involve our domestic politics, religious sensitivities and (lest we forget) moral issues! We will address these in Part-II.

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